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abstract This paper is a response to some recent discussions of many-minds inter-
pretations in the philosophical literature. After an introduction to the many-minds
idea, the complexity of quantum states for macroscopic objects is stressed. Then it
is proposed that a characterization of the physical structure of observers is a proper
goal for physical theory. It is argued that an observer cannot be defined merely by
the instantaneous structure of a brain, but that the history of the brain’s functioning
must also be taken into account. Next the nature of probability in many-minds inter-
pretations is discussed and it is suggested that only discrete probability models are
needed. The paper concludes with brief comments on issues of actuality and identity
over time.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some philosophical issues which have
arisen in “many-minds” interpretations of quantum theory. The paper begins with
a brief introduction to the many-minds idea laying particular emphasis on the com-
plexity of quantum states for macroscopic objects. A more thorough introduction at
an elementary level is given in Lockwood 1996a. The relationship between mind and
brain is of fundamental importance to many-minds interpretations and in the second
section, I shall argue that, in the light of quantum theory, we should revise our under-
standing of what a brain is. In particular, I shall suggest that the history of a brain’s
functioning is an essential part of its nature as an object on which a mind supervenes.
Then I shall turn to the issue of probability in many-minds interpretations and argue
against the claim that there should be a continuous infinity of minds at each instant.
I shall also make a number of briefer comments on other philosophical questions. In
three long and technical papers (Donald 1990, 1992, 1995) I have presented a version
of the many-minds interpretation which I believe to be compatible with special rel-
ativity, with quantum field theory, and with the macroscopic and thermal nature of
real observers. The ideas discussed here stem from that technical work but also stand
independent of it.
Many-minds interpretations are a class of “no collapse” interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics, which is considered to be a universal theory. This means that they
assert that all physical entities are governed by some version of quantum theory, and
that the physical dynamics of any closed system (in particular, the entire universe)
is governed entirely by some version, or generalization, of the Schro¨dinger equation.
From the point of view of a committed quantum theorist, who knows neither of any
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experimental evidence for any breakdown in quantum theory, nor of any alternative
theory which is not both ad hoc and incompatible with special relativity, these asser-
tions may seem plausible (cf. Deutsch 1996). It is certainly the case that, at least over
short time intervals, quantum states can be found which will give apparently accu-
rate representations of the physical states of essentially all non-gravitational physical
systems, however large or complex they may be. Indeed, states can be found which
are not only “apparently accurate” in the sense that they are compatible with all our
actual short-term observations, but also in the sense that they represent any parti-
cle as being, during the interval considered, sufficiently well-localized to accord with
conventional pictures of that type of quantum particle. Thus, in such states, the
atoms in our environment are represented as slightly fuzzy balls, while free electrons
are represented as moving along slightly fuzzy straight lines. I shall call these states
“pragmatic”. For example, a pragmatic state for a gas might use minimum uncer-
tainty wave-packets centred on definite choices of positions and momenta to describe
the centre of mass variables of the molecules, together with appropriate choices of
molecular wavefunctions for the electronic variables. At a more sophisticated level,
using our excellent understanding of quantum states for single molecules, and the
possibility of building such quantum states up to describe many molecules, pragmatic
quantum states can be ascribed at any time to any chemical system – including the
human brain. The fundamental problem – the problem of “Schro¨dinger’s cat” – arises
because the time continuation given by the quantum mechanical dynamics does not
always lead from a quantum state which provides an apparently accurate description
at one time to a quantum state which provides a similarly apparently accurate de-
scription at later times. The pragmatism of a state, in other words, is time dependent.
Consider, for example, electrons contributing to the production of an interference
pattern by passing, one at a time, through some kind of two-slit device and hitting
a position detector. (Pictures from such an experiment are presented in Tonomura
et al. 1989.) I have chosen this example, partly because the pictures are such a
direct demonstration of the difference between quantum state and observation, partly
because the electrons are more likely to be seen to hit some parts of the detector than
others, and partly because I think that the two-alternative experiments by which this
subject is usually introduced foster a na¨ıve view of the complexity of quantum states
(cf. Weinstein 1996).
According to quantum mechanics (by which I shall henceforth mean universal, no
collapse, quantum mechanics), nothing determines the points on the detector where
the electrons hit. Indeed, if a pragmatic state is given for an electron at the beginning
of the experiment, then the slits act to amplify the fuzziness of its original trajectory,
so that as it approaches the detector, the state associated with it will represent some
sort of weighted distribution over all possible hitting points. The “many worlds” idea
is that such “superpositions” of possibilities can form part of a correct and complete
description of the physical world and that all possible hittings do, in some sense,
happen. This is an interesting idea, but it leads immediately to questions as to why
each electron is only ever seen to hit at one point and to what the probability of any
particular hitting being seen means. That the word “seen” slips naturally into these
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questions, suggests that here, as in so many other attempts to understand quantum
mechanics, “the observer” has some special role to play. Everett himself said (in
DeWitt and Graham 1973, p. 117) that, within the context of his theory, “it develops
that the probabilistic aspects of [von Neumann’s] Process 1” (the collapse of the
wavefunction) “reappear at the subjective level, as relative phenomena to observers.”
Consider, therefore, someone who is looking an image produced directly by the
detector, or even someone who is looking at one of the photographs reproduced from
Tonomura et al. 1989 on page 3 of Silverman’s 1995 book. They will see a picture
of a definite pattern of specks. Nevertheless, if we consider the quantum states that
we should associate to the physical structures of these human beings, and, if we
start by looking back in time as far as the beginning of the experiment and take as
our initial condition a “pragmatic” state for the entire situation at that time, then,
solving the Schro¨dinger equation will lead to quantum states which by the time of
the observations considered will also describe some sort of weighted distribution; in
this case over brains seeing possible patterns of specks. A many-minds theory aims
to accept such “unpragmatic” states, and to interpret them.
The first step in a many-minds interpretation is to make the hypothesis that
our nature is such that we cannot see such a picture except as a definite pattern.
The quantum state is correct in its description of a weighted distribution of possible
patterns. When a single individual comes into contact with the picture for the first
time, all those different possibilities do occur, but each different pattern is seen by
a different mind; minds which share the same past and the same name, but which
experience different presents and different futures and which have no means of com-
municating to each other. The probability of seeing a given pattern is determined, at
least to a first approximation, by the corresponding weight in the quantum state.
In any no collapse interpretation, including the modal interpretation and the
Bohm interpretation as well as all versions of the many-worlds interpretation, we
start off with only one quantum state: the uncollapsing universal quantum state,
which I shall denote by ω. ω can be identified by going backwards in time. Each time
we pass back through the appearance of a collapse we get a better approximation
to ω. Eventually, we arrive back at the big bang. For the moment, we may ignore
the question of whether the big bang itself was merely the appearance of a collapse.
The quantum state of the universe coming out of the big bang looks – at least in its
non-gravitational aspects – very like a thermal equilibrium state. In the Hamiltonian
(uncollapsed) time propagation of that state, the stars and planets which we see now
do not exist as definite objects, and certainly neither does any particular measuring
device now being used by us on one of those planets. ω seems to be a complete
mess. However, it does have a great deal of hidden structure, and it is the job of a no
collapse interpretation to explain how that hidden structure comes to be seen.
Most workers in no collapse interpretations have produced no more than ele-
mentary models based on the definite existence of specific measuring devices. They
have assumed, for example, that the Hilbert space of the universe splits naturally
into a tensor product structure compatible with the measurement under considera-
tion. They have also assumed, even when describing the behaviour of macroscopic
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objects, that it is appropriate to employ models in which only a few dimensions of
Hilbert space are used to describe all the relevant behaviour. In my opinion, these
assumptions are untenable (cf. Bacciagaluppi, Donald, and Vermaas 1995). The first
assumption begs the question of what is natural, and depends on assumptions about
the nature of particles which are known to be false according to relativistic quantum
field theory (Haag 1992). As far as the second is concerned, a measure of the number
of dimensions relevant to a macroscopic object can be given by eS/k where S is the
absolute thermodynamic entropy of the object and k is Boltzmann’s constant. This
number is so large that it must call into question any argument which refers to “the
wavefunction (ψobserver) of the observer”. Possible wavefunctions do exist, but there
are something like eS/k orthogonal choices available, and any one of these choices will,
by entanglement with the environment, rapidly move into a mixture with the other
choices. This vast complexity of available observer states suggests, for example, that
Weinstein 1996 is quite right to criticize Albert and Loewer’s 1988 invocation of a
projection measuring a belief held by a observer.
The analysis of ω is not however a hopeless task. The secret lies in the idea
of “correlation”. Quantum states, particularly many-particle quantum states, are
patterns of correlations. For example, consider the quantum state describing a volume
of hydrogen and oxygen atoms in a two-to-one mixture which has come to chemical
and thermal equilibrium at room temperature and pressure. The state is a canonical
ensemble equilibrium density matrix. It is not a pure state, but that is only to be
expected, because states of non-isolated macroscopic systems are virtually never pure.
(As I discuss elsewhere, this lack of purity does not solve the conceptual problems
we are considering (Donald 1990, 1992).) The important point is that it is not a
pragmatic state because it does not describe a collection of water molecules with well-
defined positions. Indeed, the position distribution of each individual atom considered
separately will be spread uniformly over the entire container. Nevertheless, if the
position of one of the oxygen atoms is taken as given, then the same equilibrium
quantum state determines a distribution for the other atoms which will be such that
precisely two hydrogen atoms will be closest to the given oxygen position, and those
two will be around 0.096nm distant. Similarly in the Schro¨dinger cat state – if there
has been a radioactive decay, then the cat is dead; if there is broken glass, then the
flask which contained the poison has been broken, and the cat is dead; if, as he richly
deserves, the experimenter’s face is scratched when he opens the steel box, then the
radioactive atoms have not yet decayed. An adequate analysis of the correlations in
ω is the first step towards an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The object of supervenience
If we are to make sense of the many worlds idea and demonstrate how the world
that we see is extracted from ω, it would appear that we need to be able to say what a
world is. Saunders 1996b has pointed out that there are three ways of approaching this
problem. One is direct attack, by mathematical definition. In my opinion, “consistent
histories” is an example of this approach. So far, however, I do not believe that this
direct approach has been successful. Dowker and Kent 1996, in particular, have
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found many problems with the consistent histories program. It is not clear that the
abstract definition of a consistent history does solve the problem of defining a world,
because there are many possible sets of consistent histories, and no way of choosing
one particular set is available. The second approach is the “many minds” idea. Here
we give observers a central role. We do not need a general definition of “worlds”, but
we do need to define “observers”. The only worlds which are considered important
are identified by correlations to those observers and, as Brown 1996 has emphasized,
these external worlds are secondary, derived, concepts. The final approach is the
idea, championed by Saunders 1995, 1996a,b, of “relativism”. The claim here is that
we do not need to define “worlds”; the total pattern of correlations established by
the universal quantum state are sufficient in themselves as a foundation for physics.
Saunders claims consistent histories as an example of relativism. As it stands at
present, I would accept that it is possible to interpret consistent histories in either
way.
Saunders’ approach might seem to avoid the problem of definition, but, in my
opinion, this is not a problem that we should be trying to avoid. Although the
correlations established by ω are enough to provide a description of objective reality,
they do not give us any understanding of subjective reality. We are here and we look
out at the universe entirely through those particular correlations which ω establishes
to our brains. These correlations are the ones that count. We do not need another
“view from nowhere” in physics.
I also do not believe that we exist merely “for all practical purposes”. In a state
of water at equilibrium, I can localize the oxygen atoms, to a certain extent, by giving
the positions of the hydrogen atoms, or I can localize the hydrogen atoms, to a certain
extent, by giving the positions of the oxygen atoms. Similarly, in Saunders’ program,
the state of our brains determines for all practical purposes the state of the world
that we experience, and the state of the world that we experience determines for all
practical purposes the state of our brains. But this raises the as-yet-unsolved technical
problem of producing a theory, at the level of ω, of the “quasi-classical domains” in
terms of which, for all practical purposes, our experienced world is to be described
(Saunders 1993, Gell-Mann and Hartle 1993). Not only does it seem to me that it
is more straightforward to solve the technical problem of finding an unambiguous
characterization of an observer (Donald 1995), but also I believe that consciousness
is a fundamental pillar of existence and must therefore be something definite.
In my opinion, I am what I am, and I want to discover what that what might
be. In particular, I want to discover exactly what the physical manifestations of that
what might be. Which physical properties are fixed by the existence of a given state
of my mind, and which properties are only probabilistically constrained? Here the
ontological issue that “I am what I am” must be distinguished from the epistemological
question of whether I can know what I am. No conscious being can be aware of his
exact state, but this does not mean that he does not need to be in some exact state.
I think that it is the proper task of an analysis of quantum theory to try to give an
exact definition of the possible physical manifestations of an observer.
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The doctrine of psychophysical supervenience claims that two people cannot differ
mentally without also differing physically (Lewis 1986, p. 14). In a classical picture,
brains are just there, and the investigation of exactly on what aspects of those brains
the corresponding minds supervene hardly seems to be an essential task. In quantum
theory, however, the universal quantum state is a grand superposition of possibili-
ties. Some of those possibilities do seem to contain structures which look like brains
or which function like brains. Now the doctrine of supervenience no longer merely
provides a convenient name behind which questions about the nature of mind can be
hidden. Instead, it raises the difficult but intriguing technical problem of analysing
such a superposition (cf. Albert and Loewer 1988, Barrett 1995, Lehner 1997). This
requires discovering what the relevant physical constitution of a person might be. In
other words, the problem is to discover a physical “object of supervenience” such
that the doctrine of supervenience holds in the form that two people with identical
“objects of supervenience” are mentally identical. Putting this another way, the idea
of psychophysical parallelism encounters the problem of identifying just what it is to
which the psyche is supposed to be parallel.
One way of approaching these problems is to consider the preliminary claim
that two brains which are physically sufficiently similar, necessarily give rise to the
same mental phenomena. Even without any analysis of “necessarily”, “the same”, or
“mental phenomena”, this claim seems plausible. For example, it seems to me to be
plausible that mental phenomena would not change if the temperature of the brain was
changed by less than one thousandth of a Celsius degree, nor if the pH changed by less
than 0.01. So what exactly does “physically sufficiently similar” mean? What physical
structures could be used to define such equivalence classes of brains? Can we describe
the minimal amount of structure required or discover a simple characterization of the
equivalence classes? Initially, I shall refer to anything which is a brain by virtue of
having such a structure, as being “an object of supervenience”, although I am working
towards a position in which, strictly speaking, the term should be reserved for the
equivalence classes rather than for the members of those classes.
It is important that the words “give rise” in the claim also be taken seriously.
There are two different techniques by which it is possible to think about what it
means for a physical situation to imply the existence of mental phenomena. The
more conventional technique is to imagine strange ways in which such a situation could
arise and to contemplate whether the proposed mental phenomena remain plausible.
For example, someone who claims that it is only the instantaneous structure of a
brain which has any importance, could be required to consider the possibility that a
functioning piece of flesh could be constructed merely by bringing the requisite atoms
together, for a moment, in a vat. A more powerful technique, however, is to imagine
the mind as a “ghost in a machine” and to ask what properties of the machine the
ghost would use to find its meaning. This is not to suggest that the ultimate aim is
not to exorcize all such ghosts. The object of supervenience exists for itself. However,
if the physical structure is sufficient to imply the meaning, then the meaning must
be interpretable from the physical structure. Imagining a ghost is merely a way of
thinking about what might be required in the interpretation of physical structure.
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For example, if the doctrine of supervenience is to have any force, then the meaning
should be interpretable without requiring that the ghost be an educated human being
with a training in twentieth century neurophysiology and nineteenth century physics
who already knows that the machine is a functioning human brain.
For many of those who have written on the many-minds interpretation, the object
of supervenience is an element of a basis of brain states. For example, Lockwood 1996a
refers to a “consciousness basis” and Albert and Loewer 1988 to an incomplete basis
of “brain (or brain + environment) states”. In neither case, is the particular basis
identified. In my opinion, the attachment to the idea of a basis is a mistake based
on a false analogy with elementary models of measurement theory. A human brain is
not like an atom in a Stern-Gerlach device, nor is it like a Copenhagen-interpretation
measuring device which bears on its cover the name of the self-adjoint operator which
it is designed to measure. A brain is warm and wet. The number eS/k of available
wavefunctions is something like 1010
26
. The identification of a suitable basis might
be expected to require identification of exactly which molecules are to be included in
any given basis state. Is this set of molecules to include the blood which is pumping
through the brain, and the molecules which it is breathing? Where is the outside
surface of the brain (or in Albert and Loewer’s case of the brain + environment) to
be drawn? Is Albert part of Loewer’s environment, and if not, where is the line of
separation? Why should any, arbitrarily small, change in pH – which changes the
number of hydrogen ions in the brain, and therefore changes the basis state – be
sufficient to change the object of supervenience?
Many-minds authors have also tended to assume that the object of supervenience
is a brain at an instant. This too is an assumption with which I disagree, and I con-
tinue to disagree, even if “the instant” is modified, as Butterfield 1996 proposes,
to cover the duration of a psychological moment. The doctrine of supervenience has
become dominant in modern philosophy, at least in part because of the success of neu-
ral computation models of the brain (e.g. Dennett 1991, Churchland and Sejnowski
1992). In the framework of classical physics, these models are part of an increas-
ingly convincing demonstration that everything that a mind appears to understand
or feel is reflected in detail in neural functioning. However, although behaviour may
be governed entirely by instantaneous neural functioning, this does not imply that in-
stantaneous functioning is sufficient for mental understanding. Indeed, in my opinion,
even short-term functioning carries, in itself, very little meaning.
Imagine that you were given a perfect snapshot of a brain. How would you begin
to understand the information that was being processed? How would you understand
the dispositions of the individual under study? Suppose that you find excitement in
one part of the brain, for example, the occipital lobe. The name merely tells you that
this is at the back of the head. Tracing nerve cells will connect this part to a part
at the front of the head which we call the retina, and which you and I know to be
involved in vision. How would a ghost in the brain faced with such a snapshot know
what the retina is for? How would he know in which direction nerve cells should be
traced? How would he even know that nerve cells – rather than glial cells, or blood
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vessels, or the positions of individual atoms, or electrons – are what he should be
studying?
Supervenience suggests that it be possible to make explicit all the information
that a ghost would require for understanding. Suppose then, that we tell the ghost
roughly what a brain is and how it functions; suppose, for example, that we give him
a textbook of neurophysiology. With a perfect snapshot of the brain, he could then
perhaps make a model which he could try to use to find out how the actual brain
under consideration was functioning. He would have to run that model under all sorts
of different, but physiologically “normal”, conditions in order to find out the details
of how it worked and exactly what it was doing and remembering at the instant of the
snapshot. The required knowledge of the conditions of operation of the brain and the
results of his simulations would already seem to go far beyond the physical instant.
Exactly the same types of simulation would also be required to explicate what a brain
was doing given a “psychological moment”, or even to understand objectively how
long such a moment should last.
It would only be possible not to go beyond the physical instant, if human brains
were “off-the-shelf” devices for which one could, in theory, provide a handbook map-
ping instantaneous molecular structure into function. However, human brains seem to
be more like “neural net” machines, whose function is best discovered by simulation,
than they are like progammable computers, whose function can be explained more
compactly by provision of the manual and the program. This applies in particular
to the details of the functioning. Moreover, even considered classically, human brains
do not work deterministically at the level of neural processing. In the details of its
functioning, a brain is metastable and information is processed by the accumulation
of small and uncertain effects. Thus we cannot tell by looking at a brain, how it has
arrived at its current state. Different, physiologically normal, prior histories could
lead to physically identical brains. It seems to me to be a bold assumption that these
different histories would necessarily result in identical awareness of the same present.
My preferred alternative is to take the object of supervenience to be the entire
lifetime history of the brain in question up to the moment of the snapshot. Michael
Lockwood has commented that this gives a picture of us as dragging our histories
behind us like “Marley with his chain” (Dickens 1843). The relevant history of a
brain is a history of patterns of neural firings. An explicit description of a history of
patterns would be a much simpler description of the information required by a ghost
than would be a textbook of neurophysiology and a full record of simulations. It would
be simpler in two senses. It would be shorter, because a full record of simulations
would need to analyse all the possible behaviours of the brain, and not just the actual
past behaviour. It would also be more abstract and less contingent: a history of
patterns, for example, would not even require a carbon-based biochemistry for the
object of supervenience. Such a history may be thought of as a minimal structure
sufficient to define the causal relations required by functionalism.
An appeal to the idea of functionalism seems to me to be an important part of the
hypothesis that the brain is, in some sense, an adequate model of the mind. (For more
about this hypothesis in the present context, see the non-technical second section of
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Donald 1995.) Most many-minds authors, although paying lip-service to materialism,
seem to me to lose sight of this hypothesis by referring to instananeous mental states
distinguished by unexplicated labels (e.g. Albert and Loewer 1988 “belief states”,
Lockwood 1989 “phenomenal perspectives”, Page 1996 “perceptions”). Barrett has
advised me that “belief states” should be interpreted as “dispositions” (Albert 1992,
p. 129), but once again I think that our “dispositions” can be more parsimoniously
represented by an account of what we have done, or said, or thought, than by an
account of what we might do, or say, or think. The theory I am proposing is not
functionalism because I require that the causal relations be incarnated according
to specific quantum theoretical rules – rules explained in the technical sections of
Donald 1990 and 1995. It is also more explicit than conventional functionalism in
that the mental is taken to be constructed from a specific type of finite pattern
of causal relations between elementary events. My dream is that such an explicit
and finite formulation could ultimately be used to reduce functionalism to a kind of
linguistics concerned with the study of possible meanings of finite stuctures built up
from elementary ideas like “this is the same as that”, “this is not the same as that”,
“this is that continued indefinitely”, “this is pleasant”, “this is not pleasant”. Using
this linguistics, I would hope that it would possible to argue that any “instantaneous”
mental state could be interpreted as the culmination of something like a (very long)
book written in a language of such elementary ideas. However while the books we
read have only a one-dimensional causal structure – one word comes after another –
the structures I have proposed would also allow for spacelike separated “words”.
In as far as we are ghosts stuck in our brains, I think that we do make sense of
our present pattern of neural firings as a development of earlier patterns. It seems
to me to be wrong to suggest that one particular pattern is a tasting of a rather too
strong cup of coffee, merely because of the present arrangement of the atoms in my
brain. I have become aware of the meaning of arrangements of atoms in my brain,
not by a process of analysis, but by existing as that functioning brain, throughout
a lifetime of many cups of coffee. It will perhaps be objected that I cannot, in fact,
remember anything which is not somehow contained in the present arrangement of
atoms. I accept that. However, the question is not what I can remember, but how I
give meaning to my physical structure. I do not activate memories of previous cups
of coffee in order to discover what I am now tasting. Instead, by the activation of
patterns in my brain which are correlated with earlier patterns (and hence with earlier
drinks), I become a tasting of coffee. Consciousness develops. It is not born anew at
each instant.
It would not matter greatly to our understanding of classical physics whether the
object of supervenience was a brain at an instant or the history of a brain. However, in
the many-minds interpretation, the distinction is absolutely fundamental. A history
of a brain cannot be recorded in a single wavefunction. As has already been discussed,
although it is always possible to find wavefunctions which form apparently accurate
representations of a brain as it can be observed, or experienced, at one instant, there
are no single wavefunctions which are simultaneously apparently accurate representa-
tions of the brain as it is observed over periods long enough to include, for example,
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performance of the electron interference experiment mentioned above. Indeed, in
Donald 1990, I argue that “pragmatic” states in the brain would have to be replaced
on a very short (e.g. millisecond) time scale, whether or not the brain was involved in
the observation of quantum experiments. Thus if the object of supervenience is to be
a history, then it has to be represented either by some sort of sequence of quantum
states, or, as in consistent histories, by a sequence of projections. (In fact, these
alternatives are, to some extent equivalent because of the duality between states and
operators. For example, in my own technical work, in which an explicit construction
of a quantum model of the history of a brain is given, the sequences of quantum states
invoked are themselves defined by corresponding sequences of projections.)
I suggested above that the proper task of an analysis of quantum theory is to
try to give an exact definition of the possible physical manifestations of an observer.
Ultimately, I think that any many-minds program aims to characterize an observer
abstractly as an information-processing structure and to explain how that structure
manifests itself physically as some sort of objectively real quantum mechanical struc-
ture probabilistically constrained by some sort of universal quantum state ω. For
example, an observer might be manifested by a physical system with a wavefunction
which was an element of a “consciousness basis”, and abstractly characterized by a
definition of such a basis. In my own work, in order to deal with the wide range of
imperceptible variations in possible descriptions of the physical structure of a given
observer, I have found myself moving ever further from the “pragmatic wavefunction”
picture of elementary quantum mechanics. For example, I have moved from sequences
of quantum states, corresponding to a brain history, to abstractly characterized sets of
sequences of quantum states. This is a progression away from na¨ıve physical realism
towards a position in which the the physical world external to the observer exists only
as something which provides (observer-independent) probabilities for his (objectively
real) present and future existence. The progression is driven by the aim of finding
an exact “object of supervenience”. The elements of my sets of sequences of quan-
tum states are sequences which cannot be distinguished by the observer. Yet each
of these indistinguishable sequences has the same relation to the universal quantum
state, and should have the same ontological status. I am, incorrigibly, what my mind
is. That subjective incorrigibility corresponds objectively to something definite which
is governed by physical law. I am not an approximation. If I am a set of possible
brain states, then I am that set, not some element of that set. This position may be
contrasted with that of Lockwood 1996b, p. 458, who refers to calculating transition
probabilities by considering sets of minds, which he refers to as sets of “identical max-
imal experiences”. In as far as there are such sets of identical experiences, I would
associate them with the same mind.
At the abstract level – the level of functionalism – I associate any observer with
a finite structure. Moreover, within a given bound on complexity, only finitely
many observers are possible. I shall argue below that this finiteness is crucial in
understanding probability in a many-minds interpretation.
It is possible to take the progression away from na¨ıve physical realism further
than I have previously suggested, to a point at which the definiteness of the universal
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quantum state itself is called into question. I calculate probabilities by maximizing
likelihood over indistinguishable possibilities. This maximization can be extended to
allow variation in ω. In this way, I believe that it may be possible to arrive at a
physics with no a priori physical constants at all. According to such a theory, our
observations fix the value of physical constants for us, in exactly the same way that our
observations fix for us the particular position at which an electron has hit a position
detector. If this goal can be achieved, then it may indeed be claimed that we have
a theory in which “arbitrariness” or “contingency” has been reduced. Lewis (1986,
§2.7) argues that modal realism does not reduce arbitrariness on the grounds that the
existence in our world of a specific value for a physical constant would be as arbitrary
as the unique existence of that value. However, in the theory which I am sketching,
physical constants would not have precise values in “our worlds”. There might, for
example, depending on what information was available, be no fact of the matter about
whether the reciprocal of the fine structure constant was for a given observer closer to
137.03601 or to 137.03602, let alone about whether it was a rational or an irrational
number. Only the finite amount of information which determines one’s structure as
observer would determine the “world” in which one lives, while only a finite set of
axioms, containing no arbitrary constants, would determine the set of possible worlds.
Probability
There has been much discussion of the meaning of probability in the many-minds
interpretation. Here I agree with Butterfield 1996 that specific definitions of proba-
bility measures can be justified both by formal and by dynamical considerations. In
Donald 1992, I present formal justifications for probabilities in a many-minds theory.
Papineau 1996 has stated that correct probabilities “(1) have their values evidenced
by frequencies, and (2) provide a decision-theoretic basis for rational decisions.” He
goes on to say that these stipulations have no good justification. As far as the jus-
tification of (1) is concerned, many authors have pointed out that the laws of large
numbers are circular. These laws show only that there is negligible probability of
a long-run relative frequency diverging significantly from the probability which is to
be justified (cf. Kent 1990, who gives a critical survey of quantum mechanical ver-
sions of these laws). Here I would merely comment that, at least in quantum theory,
negligible probability is the same as small in the topology of the space of quantum
states. This topology is a cornerstone of the entire theory of quantum physics. Thus,
any justification of quantum physics as a whole, including, for example, from over-all
consistency or beauty, may help to justify specific numerical probabilities. Although
DeWitt, (in DeWitt and Graham 1973, p. 168) was certainly wrong to claim that the
“mathematical formalism of the quantum theory is capable of yielding its own inter-
pretation”, nevertheless, it seems to me that, because the topology is so natural and
fundamental a part of the theory, arguments based on the topology can be at least as
intuitively satisfying as counting arguments in a theory of equiprobable events. We
may not be able to explain why the world we happen to have experienced was typical,
but, if we can give meaning to the idea of a “world”, then at least it is possible for
“typical” to be well-founded and consistent.
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As far as the basis for rational decisions is concerned, the question is whether
or not, if we accept a many-minds theory, it makes any difference to how we make
decisions. Here, despite Papineau’s 1995 and 1996 arguments that it should make no
difference, I do retain a suspicion that, if one does take many-minds theory seriously,
then it does make a difference. I think myself that it makes one think more carefully
about all the possible outcomes of an action. If all futures happen, then one cannot get
away with anything any more. A lucky escape in this world is merely confirmation
that many other worlds are unpleasant. Perhaps if we accept many-minds then it
ought to lead us to be more “rational”; to take seriously, for example, the very large
negative utilities that we might attach to some very unlikely events. Whether this is
a good thing or not depends on how we draw the line between being careful and being
neurotic; how we manage to accept the reality of risk without being overwhelmed by
it.
Papineau 1995 claims that it “is simply a basic truth about rational choice”
that “rational agents ought to choose those actions which will maximize the known
objective probability of desired results”. Lockwood 1996b responds that “choosing
those actions which maximise the expected return, means maximising the total actual
return, as integrated over the successors of whatever instantaneous mind is making
the decision”. My problem with this response is that I can see no reason to integrate
over successors. However much an individual may believe in a many minds theory, all
he can experience, and all he is ever going to experience, is one mind. Suppose, for
example, that you were given the opportunity to take part in a single trial in which
you would win £1000 with probability 0.6 and lose £1000 with probability 0.4. Your
expected return would be £200. But, whatever may happen, you are not going to
experience receiving £200. Your only possible experiences, whether or not your future
contains both, will be that of winning a large sum and that of losing a large sum.
Even if the monetary quantities are accurate representations of the personal utilities
to you of the individual events of winning or losing, it is these individual possibilities
which matter and not their average.
Suppose that we accept Papineau’s view of the difficulty of justifying probability.
It would not follow that we do not understand what it is like to experience probabilistic
events. Even young children enjoy games of chance and can eventually learn that
their wishes do not affect the throw of a die. In my opinion, it would be sufficient
for a many minds theory to provide a theory of transition probabilities according to
which we experience reality as being like watching a particular, identified, stochastic
process. My own published work does not at present succeed in achieving this goal.
Nevertheless, by modifying some technical details in my approach to identity over
time and by an analysis of the finite number of immediate descendants of a given
minimal ordered switching structure (Donald 1995, Section 5), I now believe that it
is possible to modify it so that it does.
Lockwood also claims that his theory can be modified to achieve such a goal.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the types of stochastic process
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which we invoke. My work is based on the calculation of a priori probabilities of exis-
tence for completely and finitely specified individual observers with finite-step histo-
ries which are completely specified up to a given moment. These a priori probabilities
are in general non-zero. Thus I am proposing a theory of transition probabilities
which says that we experience the world as being like, for example, the development
of a random walk on a lattice. We know what it is like to watch such a process.
Examples can easily be constructed on a computer, or even just by throwing a die.
Lockwood 1989 and Albert and Loewer 1988, on the other hand, require the exis-
tence of an uncountable number of minds at each instant. It is impossible to assign
non-zero probabilities at any time to more than a countable number of distinct en-
tities. If there were an uncountable number of minds, then experience would be like
Brownian motion, but it seems to me that we have no idea of what it would be like
fully to experience such a process. Brownian motion is a continuous time process on
a continuous state space. We cannot construct explicit physical models of continuous
processes of this type, which involve infinitely many states. We can only make finite
models. Sample paths of a genuine Brownian motion have infinite complexity. Indeed,
almost all of the individual elements of any infinite set must have infinite complexity
in some sense. I certainly do not know what it would be like to watch, in all its detail,
something with infinite complexity.
This returns us to the question of Lockwood’s sets of “identical maximal experi-
ences”. If it is not accepted that those sets themselves are the objects of supervenience,
then what is it like to be a mind? Probabilities are assigned to measurable sets. Which
measurable sets are meaningful in Lockwood’s theory? (cf. Loewer 1996.) Does it,
for example, mean anything that I might be in one half of a given set of “identical
maximal experiences” rather than another? What does distinguish one individual
object of supervenience from another?
Lockwood 1996a proposes a continuous infinity of minds becauses he argues that
if there were only a finite set of minds then the probability distribution “should” be
uniform. He maintains this argument in the face of objections by Saunders 1996b,
by Papineau 1996, and by Butterfield 1996 (the last, in particular, remarking that
the principle of indifference is “a notorious dead horse”). Lockwood 1996b appears to
insist that probability on a finite number of possibilities all of which are actual must
necessarily be a simple matter of counting, on the grounds that “where it is stipulated
that the history of a mind, beyond a certain point, has just n discrete continuations,
all of which are actual . . . there is no freedom . . . to partition this n-fold continuation
in any other way than that stipulated”. In my opinion, however, there is no reason
why with a finite set of actual minds, the probability of one mind should not be
greater than that of another. The a priori probability of a given mind is part of the
objective structure of the universe. It is a number. A central concern of physical
theory is to define such numbers. The numbers which arise will depend on the details
of the theory, and their justification will be a fundamental part of the justification
of the theory. In a theory which uses a consciousness basis (ϕi)i≥1 and a universal
wavefunction ψ, the numbers would be defined as |<ϕi|ψ>|
2, and would be justified
by arguments and evidence for square amplitudes as probabilities. The axiomatic
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definition which I give in Donald 1992 and 1995 is more sophisticated, and depends
on the past physical structure of the observer in question and on the universal state ω.
Nevertheless, ultimately, the justification of my definitions once again stems from, or
is parasitic on, the evidence for the standard probabilistic interpretation of quantum
states.
Actuality
I am very grateful to Jeremy Butterfield for the interest he has shown in my work,
and for his kind comments about it (Butterfield 1995, 1996). In Butterfield 1996,
however, he express a dissatisfaction with my position on the issue of actuality. Let
me then address that issue here. Butterfield claims that this is an issue “irrespective
of mind” and which “applies equally well to ‘many worlds’ versions of Everettian
interpretations”. I disagree with this claim. In a many worlds framework, the question
is whether one should accept all possible worlds as being actual. I do not think
that anything hangs on how one answers this question. In a many minds framework,
however, the question is whether one should accept all possible minds as being actual.
In this case, there is a fundamental issue at stake. I can see no plausibility in solipsism.
(Why me?) Any of your possible minds and any one of my possible present-time minds
which shares part of my past but which is not what I am now experiencing, have the
same type of abstract characterization and the same kind of physical structure and,
because of the “no collapse” hypothesis, all those physical structures are “real” parts
of the universal state. On the basis of these similarities alone, I would be inclined to
accept the actuality both of all of your minds and of all of mine.
As Lockwood 1996a points out, a theory in which only one mind is actual for each
individual would be a hidden variable theory, with actuality as the hidden variable. In
such a theory, if, in the usual way, I measure an up-spin in one electron from a singlet
state in a EPR-Bohm situation, then, when you, at a spacelike separation, measure
the spin of the other electron, either all the well-known non-locality problems arise in
forcing the “actual” you to see a down-spin, or I can encounter a “non-actual” you –
a “mindless hulk” (Albert 1992). This is bad enough, but such a theory would also
require the identification of the set of “individuals”. At a technical level, I do not
know how this could be done. In a theory with a “consciousness” basis, how am I to
decide to whom a given element of the basis belongs? In an appropriate set of 1010
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orthogonal wavefunctions available to a warm wet brain, there is an imperceptible
passage from wavefunctions which represent me to those which represent you. Where
is this line to be drawn? Even in my theory, in which individuals have pasts, all
those pasts are ultimately undifferentiated. And finally, we cannot identify the set of
all individuals present at a given moment, unless we are prepared to define “a given
moment”. To do that would be to attempt a “many-worlds” theory not a “many-
minds” theory. At the very least, incompatibility with special relativity would surely
follow.
Identity over time
There has also been much discussion in the literature of the problem of identity
over time (e.g. Butterfield 1996, §4). In this connection, I note that at the heart
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of my technical construction there is a definition (Donald 1990, Hypothesis V and
1995, Definition E), which attempts to capture, within the mathematics of quantum
field theory, the idea of an object existing through time by looking for the paths in
spacetime along which the local quantum state changes least. This is a very direct
approach to the problem, and one which shows that identity over time can be defined
without even using the idea of an “object” as being something composed of particles.
Unfortunately, there is a technical flaw in the application of this definition in my
1995 paper. The problem is that I have not allowed for the effect, on the path under
consideration, of information gained elsewhere in the brain. I believe, however, that I
can solve this problem fairly straightforwardly by disconnecting the times of quantum
state change from the times of object “switching”. Work is in progress on the details
of this revision and I hope in due course to publish it, together with the details of
the two other suggestions I have described above; one, to allow the experience of
an individual observer to be modelled as the experience of observing a particular,
identified, discrete, stochastic process, and the other, to provide a physics without
physical constants.
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